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Check Your Bank Account First:
Examining Copyright Formalities and
Remedies Through a Race Conscious
Lens
Emma R. Burri*
Abstract
This Note examines copyright formalities through a race
conscious lens and concludes that further change is necessary given
the legacy of economic inequality that communities of color
experience. It examines the history of copyright formalities in the
United States and the disenfranchisement of Black musical
creators through the theft of their intellectual property. In exploring
the relationship between race, wealth, and musical copyright
protection this Note explains why considering the economic
inequality is relevant to ensure copyright protection for Black
creators. This Note proposes abolishing the registration timeline for
certain remedies and altering the filing fee structure of the
copyright office to remove barriers to entry into the copyright system
which may disproportionately impact creators of color.
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“IP scholars are increasingly recognizing that the legal regimes
of intellectual property are inextricably linked to systems of social
and economic inequality.” 1
I. Introduction
The copyright registration system is one of the many ways
which creators can protect their creations and intellectual property
in the United States legal system. 2 Copyright protection arises as
soon as “an author fixes the work in a tangible form of expression”
and currently lasts for the life of the author plus another seventy
years after death. 3 Copyright owners have exclusive rights to
reproduce their works, perform the work publicly, and to distribute
copies via sale, just to name a few. 4 This system of copyright,
however, has not always been a tool that is accessible to all
creators. For much of the history of copyright in the United States
certain mandatory steps, copyright formalities, had to be followed
in order to gain access to the protection and benefits of copyright
ownership. 5 Failure to comply with these formalities either
terminated the copyright or prevented the protections from arising
in the first place. 6
These formalistic copyright requirements existed alongside
explicit systems of slavery and racial discrimination which
intentionally stripped Black Americans of capital, education, and
land. 7 These strict formal requirements existed “within social
structures that historically did not serve the interests of black
1. K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate
Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 1179, 1182
(2008).
2. See What is Copyright?, COPYRIGHT.GOV (explaining the basics of
copyright law) [https://perma.cc/YJ8G-TXUR].
3. See id. (detailing how fixation works and how long a copyright lasts).
4. See id. (discussing the “exclusive rights” provided under copyright law).
5. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV.
485, 492–94 (2004) (describing formalities in “early U.S. copyright laws” from
1790 to 1976).
6. See id. at 487 (explaining the consequences of failure to comply).
7. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1183 (“Racial discrimination has produced
unequal access to capital, education, land and other entitlements under slavery
and Jim Crow segregation.”).
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cultural production.” 8 Copyright formalities became another tool
to steal from and oppress Black creators. 9 While copyright has
shifted away from the rigid per se registration requirements,
timely registration of a copyright still provides significant benefit
in the form monetary damages and attorney’s fees. 10
This Note examines the history of copyright formalities, how
the history of formalities intersects with systemic racial
oppression, and whether the historical concerns surrounding these
procedural mechanisms have been adequately addressed by the
reduction in formalistic requirements. Part II provides an overview
of the origins of the copyright system in the United States and how
formalities fit within that system. 11 Part III examines how the
copyright system has historically failed to provide adequate
protection for artists of color. 12 Part IV addresses the issues of
modernization that are currently confronting copyright law and
how formalization does or does not adequately address them. 13
Part V examines how recent legislation has failed in modernizing
musical copyright and in addressing the concerns of creators of
color and explores the persistent economic inequality that BIPOC
are still facing as a result of generations of discrimination. 14 Part
VI argues for the abolition of the limitations on remedies for failure
to register within three month of creation. 15 Part VII advocates for
two potential alternative fee structures which could be adopted to
make registration less of a financial hardship for creators. 16 These
proposed changes would be small but significant changes to the
8. Id.
9. See id. at 1202 (suggesting that copyright formalities are “just another
form of white domination given the state of Black education and legal
representation in the 1920s”).
10. See What is Copyright?, supra note 2, (explaining why it is important to
register a work despite it not being mandatory).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III (providing historical patterns of inadequate protection
for BIPOC artists related to music copyright).
13. See infra Part IV (explaining the state of copyright formalities in the
digital age).
14. See infra Part V (illustrating the state of the Music Modernization Act
and wealth disparity related to race).
15. See infra Part VI (detailing why the registration requirement and
limitation on remedies should be abolished).
16. See infra Part VII (arguing for alternative fee structures).
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copyright system which would be a step towards addressing the
historic and ongoing challenges that creators of color face.
II. Foundations of Copyright Law in Music
The history of copyright for music in the United States has
many twists and turns. The United States only recently extended
copyright protection to sound recordings. Until 1972 copyright
protection for music in America applied only to sheet music and
musical compositions. 17
Discussing the current state of copyright formalities and
persistent challenges first requires building basic understanding
of the origins of American copyright system. Two of the core pieces
of legislation in the copyright system are the 1909 and 1976
Copyright Acts which have shaped the vast majority of the
copyright system. 18 Understanding copyright law in the United
States next requires understanding the impact of the U.S.’s late
entry to the Berne Convention and how that corresponded to the
level of formalism in the copyright system. 19 The Berne Convention
set international minimum standards for copyright and one of
these basic principles was the elimination of formalities. 20 Next,
understanding the lingering preference for registration is essential
to examining the copyright system through a racial equity and
social justice lens. 21 The current copyright system still prioritizes
registration by limiting certain remedies for failure to register.
Beginning to examine the current state of the United States
copyright system requires first turning to British copyright law.

17. See Bruce D. Epperson, From the Statute of Anne to Z.Z.Top: The Strange
World of American Sound Recordings, How it Came About, and Why it Will Never
Go Away, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2015) (describing American
copyright protections).
18. See infra Part II.B (illustrating two pivotal pieces of legislation, the 1909
and 1976 Copyright Acts).
19. See infra Part II.C (discussing formalization generally); see also Part II.D
(analyzing changes to formalism in the United States based on Berne Convention
compliance).
20. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Berne Convention).
21. See infra Part II.E (explaining the lurking registration requirement of
section 412).
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A. Origins of the American Copyright System

The origins of copyright law stem from the Statute of Anne
passed by the British Parliament in 1710. 22 This limited copyright
protection was the early model for modern copyright law as it
created a state-sanctioned monopoly for creators (of written works
in this case), rather than just publishers or owners. 23 Copyright
law is an extension of the concepts of traditional property law to a
creator’s products to encourage and incentivize creation by
legislatively protecting a creator. 24 The United States was one of
the first nations to adopt these concepts of copyright, even
including a copyright clause in the Constitution. 25 The “Progress
Clause” of the Constitution was quickly put into effect and
Congress began legislating copyright laws. 26 These new laws had
a variety of requirements for ‘formalization’ to secure the
copyright. 27 The applicant had to deposit a copy of the printed
work, register the title, and place a newspaper notice prior to
publication all within a certain timeframe to qualify for the
protections provided. 28 Subsequent litigation established that once
a government statutory copyright system exists, that is the only
copyright law that exists and any common-law copyright is
22. See Jimmy J. Zhuang, The Rite of Copyright: The Comparative
Procedural Emphasis of American Copyright Law, 80 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017)
(describing the Statute of Anne’s limited copyright protection).
23. See id. at 5–6 (detailing how the Statute of Anne was the “model
legislation for all modern copyright law” due to its “revolutionary nature” and the
changes described).
24. See id. (“This innovative copyright revolution therefore developed a
system that incentivized authors to produce works . . . .”).
25. See id. at 6 (providing that the United States drew upon the Statute of
Anne, and principal notions of copyright protection, in the formation of the U.S.
Constitution).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the [progress] of [s]cience
and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the
exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 23 (James Madison) (explaining that the ‘Progress Clause’
distinguished American copyright laws from England because the right
guaranteed by the Constitution refers to both the copyright of authors and the
right to useful inventions).
27. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing the new requirements for
copyright enacted by Congress in 1790).
28. See id. (providing that applicants for copyright protections had to satisfy
each requirement within six months).
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terminated. 29 As various technical innovations increased
Americans’ ability to consume music on their own, it became clear
that musical copyright did not fit simply into the established
doctrines and legislation around copyrights for machines and
literary works. 30 Both the Register of Copyrights and President
Theodore Roosevelt implored Congress to revise the copyright
laws, and Congress began the process of updating copyright in
1906. 31 How to address mechanically reproduced music was one of
the primary sticking points which complicated matters and
delayed the copyright act by several years. 32
B. 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts
Despite a three year Congressional struggle to reach a
compromise, the Copyright Act of 1909 did not adequately address
mechanical sound reproduction and failed to coordinate with the
Berne Convention. 33 Sound recordings were not well addressed by
the 1909 Act and it was unclear whether a recording was eligible
for federal copyright protection. 34 It was not clear whether song
records fell under the Progress Clause as ‘writings’ or whether they
were writings, but Congress intended to exclude them from
protection. 35 The Copyright Act of 1909 further failed to address
whether selling a recorded song (regardless of the copyright status)

29. See id. at 5–7 (stating that copyright statutes override common law
copyright) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834)).
30. See id. at 6–10 (discussing how organette and phonograph technology
made music more accessible and how greater accessibility created questions about
the scope of copyrighted sheet music).
31. See id. at 10 (“Our copyright laws urgently need revision . . . they are
difficult for the courts to interpret; and impossible for the Copyright Office to
administer with satisfaction to the public.”) (citing Copyright Law Revision:
Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong., 1–2 (1960)).
32. See id. (discussing how categorizing mechanically reproduced music was
“one of the main sticking points” is enacting revised legislation).
33. See id. at 14 (describing the two “glaring errors and omissions” of the
1909 Copyright Act).
34. See id. (explaining the ambiguity around sound recordings when they
were a new technology).
35. See id. (explaining how the gap around the coverage of sound recordings
was significant to copyright law).
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would release the sound or composition into the public domain. 36
Early jurisprudence interpreting this issue extended an extremely
limited protection to sound recordings on the basis that the
Copyright Act gave composers control over how their compositions
were used. 37
The limited protection extended to a specific sound recording
protecting the recording from reproduction does not automatically
convey a right to reproduce the sound recording. 38 The failure to
adequately address sound recordings led to decades of confusing,
contradictory and uncertain protection of sound recordings under
federal copyright law. 39 The Copyright Act of 1909 had convoluted
and complex formalization requirements of notice and
publication. 40 Under the 1909 Act, an artist had to register, notify
via publishing proof publicly, notify on the copyrighted piece, and
renew their copyright. 41 An artist who was unfamiliar with the
copyright process and complex rules regarding formalization
sometimes, if not often, inadvertently allowed their works into the
public domain, which ends any economic rights to copyright
protection. 42 A call by the Register of Copyrights in the late 1960s
to include recorded performances as ‘writings’ in the constitutional
sense kicked off another wave of reform. 43
“Before 1972, music legally existed, as far as the federal
government was concerned, only in the form of musical
36. See id. (discussing the challenges of recorded songs).
37. See id. at 16 (discussing the cases decided under the 1909 Copyright Act)
(citing Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912)).
38. See id. (“[A] license to use a composition does not, in itself, convey a right
to its “production,” the means to manufacture or reproduce it.”).
39. See id. at 16–32 (describing attempts to interpret how the Copyright Act
of 1909 applies to sound recordings).
40. See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 354 (1998) (“The 1909 Act also
contained convoluted and complex requirements of notice and publication.”).
41. See Sprigman, supra note 5, at 492–94 (explaining that the 1909 Act
involved a notice requirement to “publish proof of registration in a newspaper” as
well as to mark on the work).
42. See Greene, supra note 40, at 354 (describing how allowing work into the
public domain results “in the loss of their economic rights to copyright
protection”).
43. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 35 (explaining how reforms followed the
Register of Copyrights’ statements that recorded performances are “fully creative
and worthy of copyright protection” as other writings).
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compositions written on paper.” 44 The Copyright Act of 1976
eliminated much of the rigid formalism of the 1909 Act and
reduced the number of works which would inadvertently enter the
public domain. 45 Prior to the 1976 Act many works inadvertently
became part of the public domain if they were published without
the correct formalities and were therefore deprived of copyright
protection. 46 Works in the public domain are not copyrightable and
publishing without complying with formalities divests works into
the public domain. 47 The Act of 1976 was a substantial shift in
copyright law as the Act ended the “conditional” copyright system,
where the existence and continuation of one’s copyright was
dependent on complying with formalities. 48 The reduced set of
formalities established in 1976, played a less significant role in the
existence of one’s copyright. 49 Failure to comply with the formal
conditions for registration meant a “copyright either did not arise
or was unenforceable.” 50 The Copyright Act of 1976 somewhat
addressed how sound recordings fit into the legal framework: a
musician could send in sheet music to register as a printed
composition or send in a cassette tape to protect the song only as
performed. 51 This system was an improvement, but it quickly
became subjected to abuse by producers and managers. 52 Further,
the changes did very little to clarify the existing problems and did
44. Id. at 35.
45. See Greene, supra note 40, at 354 (“The 1976 Act effectively eliminated
the traditional rigid formalities imposed under the 1909 Act as a condition of
copyright.”).
46. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 7 (“But if the score was published
without securing federal copyright, it was released into the public domain. This
was known as divestiture.”).
47. See id. (discussing what divests works into the public domain and the
impact of divestiture).
48. See Sprigman, supra note 5, at 488 (explaining the shift away from
copyright formalities).
49. See id. (describing the “reduced set of voluntary formalities” after the
Copyright Act of 1976).
50. See id. at 502 (“Until the 1976 Act, the registration and notice
requirements served as initial conditions for which noncompliance meant
copyright either did not arise or was unenforceable.”).
51. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 37 (describing copyright changes to
recorded songs from the 1976 Copyright Act).
52. See id. (explaining the system was “widely abused”).
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not provide any retroactive changes. 53 The 1976 Act did not end
any state-law copyright protections, which had become an arena
for copyright protection while federal copyright protection was
lacking. 54
The Copyright Act of 1976 did not provide sufficient detail on
when a sound recording was considered formally published. 55
‘Publication’ in copyright has the potential to release a work into
the public domain (divest a work) if the correct copyrighting
formalities are not correctly followed. 56 In La Cienega Music v. ZZ
Top, 57 the court addressed what constitutes publication: when a
song is issued to the public (via a recording of some sort) or when
the registration is secured. 58 Publication, without complying with
copyright formalities, releases a work into the public domain,
where it is not protected under a copyright scheme. 59 However,
publication does not necessarily divest an owner of their
copyright––if the owner has complied with the necessary formal
steps then their work will be protected despite being published. 60
If a sound recording, lacking the adequate formalities, constitutes
‘publication’ then issuing records would release the songs
immediately into the public domain. 61 Alternatively, the
publishing date could be determined by the date the registration
was secured. 62 The court determined that issuing phonorecords
does publish the underlying composition which would place the
53. See id. (stating that the changes “did little to rectify the pre-existing
problems” which surrounded sound recordings).
54. See id. at 38–44 (discussing how state law copyright law continues to
govern pre-1972 works).
55. See id. at 47 (explaining how publishing has a dramatic impact on a
copyright owners’ rights).
56. See id. at 7 (“But if the score was published without securing federal
copyright, it was released into the public domain. This was known as
divestiture.”).
57. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 47 (explaining the impact of publication
date in La Cienga Music v. ZZ Top).
59. See id. at 7 (describing publication).
60. See id. at 48 (explaining that one “may secure copyright for [their] work
by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act”) (citing
56 Fed. Reg. 6021 (Aug. 21, 1956)).
61. See id. (explaining pre-1972 sound recording publication challenges).
62. See id. (discussing different registration interpretations).
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work into the public domain if the publication did not have the
adequate formal notations. 63
At the time the songs at issue were recorded, a circle-C or
circle-p symbol was a required formal notice to protect a published
work. 64 The La Cienega Music court remanded as there was not
sufficient information in the record to support a determination as
to the presence or absence of the required formalities. 65 La Cienga
Music, as well as related cases, inspired Congress to retroactively
address what constitutes publication. 66 In the late 1990s Congress
amended Section 303 of the Copyright Act to clarify that
distributing phonorecords prior to 1978 would not constitute
publication for copyright purposes. 67 Despite this modification, the
issue of publication of sound recordings has “proved to be an issue
that simply refused to die.” 68 Even famous and well-known artists
run afoul of Section 303.
The Rolling Stones had recorded versions of songs which
originally dated to a composition and recording by bluesman
Robert Johnson in the 1930s. 69 Johnson’s estate filed a suit against
ABKCO (the owner of the Rolling Stone’s version of the songs)
while the House of Representatives was still considering the
language modifications to Section 303. 70 ABKCO argued that the
new language of Section 303 could not be applied in this case as
the lawsuit had begun and was not yet concluded so the legislature

63. See id. at 47–48 (describing the ZZ Top holding related to formal signals
of copyright).
64. See id. (discussing formalities related to publication which created
problems for artists).
65. See id. at 48 (“The court did not have this information.”).
66. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 50 (describing that “Congress finally had
enough” and addressed publication of sound recordings); see generally Mayhew v.
Gusto Records, 960 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn., 1997) (finding that issuing records
to the public did not publish the sound recording).
67. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 50 (explaining the new subpart (b) of
Section 303).
68. See id. at 51.
69. See id. (discussing the dispute over “Love in Vain” and “Stop Breakin’
Down”).
70. See id. (explaining the dispute in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Laverne, 217
F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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could not change a law to affect pending legislation. 71 However, a
law which simply clarifies existing policy, as the court held the
Section 303 change was, is acceptable. 72 The central theme within
the American copyright system discussed so far is what degree of
formal procedures must be complied with in order to secure a
copyright, let us now turn to what exactly formalization is and how
it persists in current copyright law. 73
C. Formalization
Copyright is considered to arise when a work is created, but
the formal processes of registering a copyright are important in the
American copyright system. 74 Registering a copyright is necessary
before an infringement suit may be filed, provides protection
against the importation of infringing copies, and is necessary to
claim the statutorily provided damages and attorney’s fees against
infringers. 75 The procedural requirements of registration can be
outcome determinative, especially for inexperienced or uninformed
copyright owners who struggle to navigate the complex system. 76
The American common law system, in concert with necessary
registration requirements, creates barriers to entry within
copyright law. 77

71. See id. (“In this case, the lawsuit had begun, but had not yet concluded,
when the change in legislation was approved.”).
72. See id. (establishing the 1997 amendment simply clarifies the meaning
of the 1909 act).
73. See infra Part II.C (explaining formalization).
74. See Zhuang, supra note 22, at 45 (stating that “copyright is secured
automatically when the work is created: and that the American copyright regime
“makes registration an essential additional requirement for copyright
ownership . . . .).
75. See id. at 45–46 (explaining why registering a copyright is necessary in
America).
76. See id. at 46–47 (explaining that the formalization requirements are
“stealthily outcome determinative” for an “unsophisticated, unregistered
copyright owner . . . .”).
77. See id. at 48 (stating that American law makers are “not attempting (as
much as their European counterparts) to make the copyright laws accessible to
the general public”).
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However, the role that formalities play in copyright law is
somewhat analogous to the formal structures in real property. 78
Transferring and recording of property title with real property is
an important formal step to demonstrate ownership via a
regulatory structure. 79 The copyright formalities are considered
play a similar role and to consolidate information and record
ownership for forms of property––indicating ownership and title to
those who care to look. 80 Formalities can serve as an important
signal of ownership, especially given that intellectual property
rights, unlike real property, will eventually terminate. 81
Ownership can also serve to help copyright owners profit from
their works through licensing arrangements, and having a formal
register can help to make licensing simpler and less expensive. 82
Understanding the state of formalization in the United States
requires looking to the international law governing formalization:
the Berne Convention. 83
D. The Berne Convention Limits on Formalization
In 1886, the Berne Convention first established international
minimum standard for copyright laws. 84 However, the United
States refused to sign onto the Berne Convention for close to 100
years, perhaps due to the United States’ status as an importer of
copyrighted materials. 85 As the United States shifted to an
78. See Sprigman, supra note 5, at 500 (discussing how copyright formalities
function similarly to formal structure in real property).
79. See id. (explaining the significance of title transfer).
80. See id. (“Formalities played an analogous role of recording ownership for
the intangible form of property in literary and artistic works that we refer to as
copyright.”).
81. See id. at 501 (discussing how signaling ownership is especially
important given the temporary nature of intellectual property).
82. See id. 501–02 (“[H]istorically, copyright formalities helped to lower the
transaction costs of licensing.”).
83. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Berne convention).
84. See Zhuang, supra note 22, at 9 (discussing the origins of the Berne
Convention and how it established minimum standards for copyright law).
85. See id. at 9–10 (“The United States in the late eighteenth century,
nineteenth century, and early twentieth century was a net importer of
copyrighted materials . . . .”).
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exporter of copyrighted materials, the economic loss due to
copyright piracy created an incentive to become a signatory to the
Berne Convention. 86 The Berne Convention requires that
copyright protection be granted to works within “literary, scientific
and artistic domains . . . .” and protects key rights such as
reproduction, performance, adaptation, etc. for a copyright term of
the author’s life and at least an additional fifty years. 87
One of the basic principles of the Berne convention was the
“abolition of formalities as a prerequisite for copyright
protection.” 88 However, the nations which joined could require
formalization under their own domestic legislation. 89 The Berne
Convention’s philosophical stance against formalization kept the
United States from joining. 90 The “only major obstacle” keeping the
United States from joining the Berne Convention was the U.S.’s
attachment to the formalization provisions. 91 Formalization has
long been a prerequisite to copyright in the United States and
introduces procedural steps to secure one’s copyright. 92 These
“philosophical differences” prevented the United States from being
in line with the standard of international law. 93 The United States
failure to join the Berne Convention placed the United States out
86. See id. at 10 (describing the copyright export of Hollywood films and
software which resulted in “losing as much as $63 billion per a year to copyright
piracy abroad . . . .”).
87. See id. (citing Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its
Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 15–16 (1988)) (stating the Berne
Convention protections).
88. See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in
the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (1988) (highlighting one of three principles
underlying the berne convention that aimed at determining the minimum
protections for countries).
89. See id. (“[E]ach contracting state could require formalities under their
own domestic copyright legislation.”).
90. See id. at 69 (“[The] philosophical differences between the U.S. copyright
system and the systems of the Berne Union members had caused the United
States to withhold its accession for over one hundred years.”).
91. See id. at 69 n.461 (“[T]he only major obstacle to U.S. accession are the
U.S. formality provisions.”).
92. See id. (discussing obstacles to U.S. accession).
93. See id. at 68 (“The Berne Union has always encouraged the United States
to accede to the Convention, but philosophical differences between the U.S.
copyright system and the systems of the Berne Union members had caused the
United States to withhold its accession for over one hundred years.”).
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of step with international law––meaning that the United States
was providing less protection to creators than the minimum
standards observed by the rest of the world. 94
In 1988 President Ronald Reagan brought the United States
into the Berne Convention and signed into law the Berne
Convention Implementation Act (BCIA). 95 The BCIA, however,
depends upon domestic legislation and the United States has “thus
far fallen short of total compliance.” 96 Berne Convention
compliance is complicated by the United States preference for
formalities. 97 Under the BCIA a copyright owner must register
their works prior to filing a claim of infringement. 98 The BCIA also
fails to eliminate a “questionable” provision under Title 17 which
limits remedies of statutory damages and attorney’s fees for failure
to register. 99 The United States is the only major country which
requires registration to obtain relief from copyright
infringement. 100 Despite the lessening of formalities upon the
United States entry into the Berne Convention, compliance with
the formality of registration is still necessary to “enjoy the full
weight of copyright protections offered by the American system.” 101

94. See id. at 16 (explaining that the Berne Convention established
“minimum standards” with the goal of “increasing the protection of authors’
rights”).
95. See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3
GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 373, 374 (1995) (discussing the Berne Convention
Implementation Act).
96. See id. at 390 (explaining that the failure to comply with the BCIA lies
within domestic legislation in the United States).
97. See id. at 395 (“Strictly speaking, certain formalities still remain after
the 1988 Implementation Act.”).
98. See id. (explaining that the failure to register no longer leads to forfeiture
of copyright, but that owners must still register to bring a suit).
99. See id. at 394–95 (explaining how the BCIA approaches limitations on
remedies); see also infra Part II.E (explaining this lingering registration
requirement).
100. See David R. Carducci, Copyright Registration: Why the U.S. Should
Berne the Registration Requirement, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 901 (2020) (“As a
result, the United States is the only major country that requires any form of
registration to obtain relief for copyright infringement.”).
101. See id. at 902 (“However, certain formalities are still required to enjoy
the full weight of the copyright protections offered by the American system. The
issue of registration exemplifies this contrasting view of formalities between the
American and Berne Convention.”).
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E. A Lurking Registration Requirement

Despite the abolition of copyright formalities upon the United
States entry to the Berne Convention, a vestige of the registration
requirement still lurks in the United States Copyright Code. 102
Section 412 of Title 17 bars certain remedies unless a creator has
registered their copyright within a certain time frame. 103 Section
412 states:
In any action under this title, other than an action brought for
a violation of the rights of the author under section 106A(a), an
action for infringement of the copyright of a work that has been
preregistered under section 408(f) before the commencement of
the infringement and that has an effective date of registration
not later than the earlier of 3 months after the first publication
of the work or 1 month after the copyright owner has learned of
the infringement, or an action instituted under section 411(c),
no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided
by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for–
1. Any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work
commenced before the effective date of its registration; or
2. Any infringement of copyright commenced after first
publication of the work and before the effective date of its
registration, unless such registration is made within three
months after the first publication of the work. 104

This registration requirement limits creators access to
remedies of statutory damages or the possibility of attorney’s fees,
creating a lurking formal registration requirement. 105

102. See supra Part II.D and accompanying text (explaining the impact of the
Berne Convention on copyright formalities).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (“Registration as a prerequisite to certain
remedies for infringement. . . .”).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
105. See id. (barring certain remedies under 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2018) and 17
U.S.C. § 505 (2018) unless the work has been registered within a certain time
frame).
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III. Historical Patterns of Inadequate Protection for BIPOC
Artists
The copyright formalities discussed above have a history of
disenfranchising artists of color, specifically Black artists. 106
Despite the enormous cultural contribution that Black artists have
made to American society, the copyright system has not protected
these artists. 107 Confronting and understanding the impact that
copyright formalities can have requires learning and addressing
the complicated history of exploiting artists of color within the
American copyright system. 108 Even in an industry which has
“generally exploited artists as a matter of course,” Black artists
have “borne an even greater level of exploitation and
appropriation.” 109 Copyright is assumed to be race-neutral, but
creators exist within our race-stratified culture and the impact of
that societal mooring bleeds into the copyright realm. 110
This section first discusses unique aspects of Black music
traditions. 111 The distinct aspects of musical traditions within
Black communities do not fit well within the formalistic dependent
U.S. copyright system. 112 Next, this section will discuss how
copyright structures have been used to strip Black creators of their
intellectual property. 113 This is followed by a brief discussion of
cultural appropriation. 114 Cultural appropriation is included to
106. See Greene, supra note 40, at 340 (“African-American music artists, as a
group, were routinely deprived of legal protection for creative works under the
copyright regime.”).
107. See id. (stating that Black artists have not been protected under the
copyright regime).
108. See id. (“But the future for Black artists—and indeed artists of all
races—will be brighter if we understand the pitfalls of the past.”).
109. See id. at 341 (stating that Black artists have difficulty claiming
ownership of their music due to the music industry taking it for its own use).
110. See id. at 343 (“An underlying assumption of race-neutrality pervades
copyright scholarship. However, not all creators of intellectual property are
similarly situated in a race-stratified society and culture.”).
111. See infra Part III.A (discussing unique musical aspects of historically
Black musical styles).
112. See infra Part III.A (explaining how revision and improvisation are at
odds with fixation and formalization).
113. See infra Part III.B (discussing theft of IP from Black creators).
114. See infra Part III.C (examining cultural appropriation).
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highlight that creative theft from Black authors is not solely
relegated to formal IP structures. This section concludes with a
discussion of how formalistic requirements were particularly
harmful to Black creators and how many lost their copyright as a
result of strict formalism. 115
A. Black Musical Tradition’s Distinct Style and History
Black musical tradition is distinct in many ways, but the
tradition of community composition and improvisation are
particularly relevant to the copyright system. 116 A system of group
oral creation conflicts with the values of American copyright law:
individual creation and registration. 117 The conflict between the
copyright system’s values and the tradition of oral group creation
in the Black community created challenges for Black artists
seeking to protect their works. 118
The communal aspect of Black musical tradition is rooted in
both African oral tradition as well as a necessity of community oral
tradition, rather than written, as a result of prohibitions on
literacy of enslaved people. 119 Because of literacy prohibitions, oral
tradition played an extremely important role in Black musical
culture and music was “learned, composed, and transmitted” via
performance. 120 In a culture of oral tradition, individual
authorship is not necessary for performance. 121 Each creator in
115. See infra Part III.D (explaining divestment and loss of copyright by Black
creators).
116. See Candace G. Hines, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law:
Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463, 469 (2005) (describing the unifying
characteristics of Black music).
117. See id. at 470 (“Born of culture and circumstance, the lack of emphasis
on written forms in Black culture directly conflicts with the American copyright
regime, since copyright is based on the written tradition of musical notation.”).
118. See id. (describing that the copyright systems emphasis on individual
“[w]ritten musical notation” hindered Black artist’s “success in the copyright
regime”).
119. See id. at 469–70 (discussing the origins of Black musical tradition as
being the African oral tradition and the legacy of slavery).
120. See id. (explaining that Black musicians relied on oral traditions to keep
their music culture ongoing).
121. See id. (citing TRICIA ROSE, BLACK NOISE: RAP MUSIC AND BLACK CULTURE
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 64 (1994)) (explaining how the communal style of
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oral tradition can put their own spin on a story or song with new
materials to make a new result. 122 The emphasis of the American
copyright system on written music as a prerequisite for copyright
protection is at odds with this system of group oral creation. 123
Further, Black musical tradition is heavily influenced by “the
African tradition of improvisation to create music . . . .” 124 Musical
improvisation occurs when performers or creators build upon prior
performances or works to create a new composition. 125
Improvisation is at odds with two central tenants of American
copyright law: the fixation requirement and the strict originality
standard. 126 Copyright law requires that works be fixed and nonchanging in a tangible medium and the “constant state of revision”
of improvisation does not allow for a fixation which truly captures
the work. 127 Improvisation’s structure of building on other works
pushes improvisational works into the category of derivative
works. 128 Only the original work’s author or creator can make
derivative works, or the original author must consent. 129 Group
creation and improvisation both trace their roots to slavery in the
United States. 130 But the importance of community and revision in
Black musical tradition still persists in music by Black creators in
genres such as rap, R&B, and countless others. 131 These stylistic
music produced by Black musicians does not fit cleanly within American
copyright principles).
122. See id. (describing oral tradition in Black communities).
123. See id. (explaining the conflict between the U.S. copyright system and
systems of oral tradition and improvisational song).
124. See id. at 472 (noting that Black music originates from African music,
making improvisation an important aspect in the creation of Black music).
125. See id. (describing improvisation as occurring “[v]ia innovative
performers who built upon what they heard before”).
126. See id. (explaining that “constant state of revision” inherent within
improvisational music is in conflict with copyright law).
127. See id. (explaining that improvisation “frustrates” fixation).
128. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101, 103 (2000) (defining a derivative work as
“[b]ased upon one or more preexisting works . . . [which have been] recast,
transformed, or adapted.”)).
129. See id. at 472 n. 58 (explaining derivative works).
130. See id. at 472 (citing Slave Codes of the State of Georgia, 1848 Art. III,
§ VI, No. 59) (“[T]he first Black musical genre in the United States emerged from
slavery, despite the prevalence of slave codes . . . .”).
131. See id. at 464 (citing DAVID BRACKETT, INTERPRETING POPULAR MUSIC
127–56 (2000) (quoting Black studies scholar Henry Louis Gates)) (“The Black
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challenges are only one part of the story of Black creators in the
copyright system––Black creators also had their rights to their
creations intentionally stolen and were denied the benefits of their
creativity. 132
B. Disenfranchisement via Copyright
Black creators have long been denied or had their proprietary
rights taken––there is a history of denying Black creators their
“credit, copyright royalties and fair compensation.” 133 Black artists
have not reaped the benefits of copyright protections and their
work has been appropriated on an industrial scale. 134 American
systems of racial discrimination, including formal systems such as
Jim Crow and enslavement, have produced unequal access to
“capital, education, [and] land.” 135 The structural inequality of the
American legal system, and American society, impact the
copyright system in a way that has failed to serve the interests of
Black creators. 136 Despite their invaluable cultural contributions,
“Black artists did not share rewards commiserate with their
enormous creativity.” 137 As a result of existing within a system of
racial discrimination, the economic and societal benefits of IP
ownership eluded, or were taken from, Black artists for much of
American history. 138

musical tradition works in a ‘trope of revision,’ that is, it is a highly creative
tradition that builds and improves upon the music within its community.”).
132. See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining how the copyright system
often disenfranchised Black creators).
133. Greene, supra note 1, at 1181 (describing the ways in which Black artists
have been denied or stripped of their proprietary rights).
134. See id. (“The mass appropriation of the work of black artists and
inventors reflects the systemic subordination based on race that characterized
most of U.S. history.”).
135. Id. at 1183.
136. See id. (“Copyright law exists within social structures that historically
did not serve the interests of black cultural production.”).
137. Id. at 1183–84.
138. See id. at 1189 (“For much of American history, the valuable rights of IP
(including compensation, credit and control) eluded Black artists operating in a
social system of racial discrimination.”).
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The intersection of contract law and IP law, specifically
copyright, facilitated widespread disenfranchisement of Black
artists’ rights to profit from their creations. 139 During the era of
ragtime, the early twentieth century, Black artists were frequently
deprived of royalties from their music due to exploitation by white
publishers. 140 Ragtime was a musical phenomenon that emerged
during the 1890’s and quickly became incredibly popular––these
swinging piano tunes were specifically composed for dancing. 141
The notion of freedom to contract facilitated unfair deals by taking
advantage of the intense racial stratification and “rendered
contract protection illusory to a large class of Black creators.” 142
The impact of the illusory freedom of contract extended to creators’
rights to their IP, which could easily be contracted away. 143 Given
the systemic oppression of Black communities, the negotiations
occurred “against a background of immense inequality,” which
extended into copyright transactions as well. 144 Black creators
experienced “disadvantage in IP transactions” which courts
rationalized under freedom to contract doctrines, which were used
by courts to justify slavery and further discrimination. 145
Scott Joplin, the originator of ragtime, did not receive an
advance for the “seminal composition Maple Leaf Rag” and

139. See id. at 1194 (“[C]ontract law, in conjunction with IP law, facilitated
the widespread fleecing of Black Artists long after the Civil Rights Act of 1876.”).
140. See id. at n.89 (“[I]t was not common to publish works by [B]lack
composers . . . . White publishers could purchase a tune or a song for ten dollars
and reap a considerable profit.”) (citing JAMES HASKINS, SCOTT JOPLIN: THE MAN
WHO MADE RAGTIME 74 (1978)).
141. See History of Ragtime, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (describing the history and
success of ragtime) [https://perma.cc/65V8-FSC4].
142. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1194–95 (pointing out that the freedom to
contract is not free from the pressures of society).
143. See id. at 1195–96 (arguing that maldistributed contract law is “directly
implicated” in the IP context).
144. See id. at 1196 (noting that “[a]fter emancipation of slaves, ‘negotiations
between [B]lack laborers and [W]hite landowners still occurred against a
background of immense inequality’”) (citing Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and
Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 359 (2001)).
145. See id. at 1197 & n.105 (stating that “contractarian arguments were
employed by Antebellum courts to justify slavery and political exclusion”) (citing
Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1,
16 (1999)).
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received a royalty of only one cent per copy sold. 146 Big Bill Crudup,
the musical force behind Elvis and known “father of rock ‘n’ roll,”
did not receive the royalties he was due and died destitute. 147
Contract law enabled a system in which Black creators were easily
separated from their credit and their royalties. 148
C. Cultural Appropriation
One early pattern of appropriation of Black expression was the
minstrel tradition. 149 In the minstrel tradition, white actors would
dress in blackface and perform the “music and comedy of black
slaves” as entertainment. 150 Minstrel shows were appropriations
of Black creativity and the financial control and windfall was
retained by whites. 151 The minstrel tradition is a crude roadmap of
the cultural appropriation which has plagued Black creators in
countless genres “from blues to ragtime, jazz, R&B and rap.” 152
Jelly Roll Morton, one of the creators who claimed to invent jazz,
died “unnoticed and unsung except by a tiny group of musicians
and jazz fans” as a result of having his music appropriated by

146. See id. at 1197–98 & n.112 (asserting that Scott Joplin agreed to the
terms because he was so intent on having his work published that he would agree
to almost any terms or conditions) (citing JAMES HASKINS, SCOTT JOPLIN: THE MAN
WHO MADE RAGTIME 101 (1978)).
147. See id. at 1198 (providing an example of a Black artist who was deprived
of royalties) (citing Arnold Shaw, HONKERS AND SHOUTERS: THE GOLDEN YEARS OF
RHYTHM AND BLUES xix (1978)).
148. See id. at 1198 (citing William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread From Authors, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 661, 665 (1996)) (outlining how contracts often
exploited Black creators).
149. See id. at 1190 (describing the problematic origins of minstrel shows).
150. See id. at 1191 (suggesting that in order to create the minstrel tradition,
White actors deliberately appropriated the music and culture of Black slaves)
(citing MARTHA BAYLES, HOLE IN YOUR SOUL: THE LOSS OF BEAUTY AND MEANING
IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 27 (1994)).
151. See id. (discussing how minstrel shows appropriated and distorted Black
tradition).
152. See id. at 1191 (describing Black cultural appropriation across multiple
genres).
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white performers. 153 Formalism also played a role in the
mechanisms of how Black creators were stripped of the profit and
prestige of their creativity. 154
D. Formalism & Disenfranchisement
Until the 1976 Copyright Act, an artistic work had to be fixed
in a tangible form such as sheet music to be protected. 155 As noted
previously, music styles which Black artists have dominated are
not well suited to fixation due to the ever-evolving nature of the
music. 156 Many early Black creators were deprived of an education
and lacked the ability to read or write to fix their work as sheet
music and qualify for protection. 157 Under the 1909 Act, federal
copyright protection arose only when a work was properly
published or registered. 158 Even if a work was registered, the 1909
Act allowed a non-creator to register a work and this had a
“particularly disadvantageous impact on Black artists” who
frequently had their works registered by others and lost their
copyright. 159 Due to the strict formal requirement of the 1909 Act,
“artists unfamiliar with legal requirements could easily find their
works injected into the public domain” and lose the economic
153. See id. at 1198 (noting that Jelly Roll Morton died destitute) (citing
JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, THE MAKING OF JAZZ: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY 106
(1978)).
154. See discussion infra Part III.D (explaining how copyright formalism was
used to disenfranchise Black creators).
155. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1201 & n.140 (noting that while sheet music
was required prior to the 1976 Act, a recording now suffices to satisfy the fixation
requirements) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007)). See also supra Part II.B
(discussing the 1909 Copyright Act).
156. See id. (highlighting the “impossibility of noting jazz rhythm accurately
using ordinary Western musical notation”) (citing PETER TOWNSEND, JAZZ IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 21 (2001)).
157. See id. (“[A]s a result of educational deprivation, many Black
artists . . . could not functionally read or write.”) (citing Greene, supra note 40, at
353–54).
158. See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the 1909 Copyright Act).
159. See Greene, supra note 40, at 353–54 (pointing out that there were no
federal copyright protections until the work was either published with proper
notice or registered, making it so that “initial copyright registration for a work
could list a claimant other than the author as the copyright owner”).
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benefits of their creative works. 160 The most egregious exploitation
of Black artists occurred under the 1909 Act. 161 The 1976 Act
eliminated many of the formalistic structures which prevent Black
artists from benefiting economically from their creative
endeavors. 162 The formal structures of copyright have historically
kept Black artists from protecting their music. 163 This loss of
copyright has deprived Black artists of millions. 164
IV. Formalities in the Digital Age
The necessity of complying with copyright formalities has
become less important in the American copyright system and
formalities have been completely abolished in some countries. 165
The Berne Convention was an important driver of this shift in
formal requirements and the United States was a latecomer to
abandoning formalities. 166 The digital technology revolution has
shifted the way that nearly all copyrighted content is both
produced and consumed, which has increased the need for “legal
certainty concerning the claim of copyright” as information freely
flows through digital channels. 167 Copyright arises automatically
upon creation and is protected from that point in the absence of
160. Id.
161. See id. (“Much of the inequality to African-American artists detailed in
this article occurred under the 1909 Act.”).
162. See id. at 354 (noting that the 1976 Act “effectively eliminated” the
traditional formal copyright requirements). See also supra Part II.B (discussing
the overall impact of the 1976 Act).
163. See generally id. (explaining the historical patterns of inadequate
protections for Black creators in the music copyright system).
164. See id. at 357 (“Social status and copyright law replicated inequality, and
deprived the African-American community of untold millions in royalties and
other revenues.”).
165. See Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the Digital Era: An Obstacle or
Opportunity?, GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF
ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 395, 395–96 (Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen,
& Paul Torremans eds., 2010) (portraying the softening of copyright formalities
globally and Germany’s complete abolition of copyright formalities).
166. See id. at 395 (stating that formalities shifted in the early twentieth
century); see also supra Part II.C (highlighting the process of formalization);
supra Part II.D (discussing the provisions of the Berne Convention).
167. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 165, at 395–96 (emphasizing the “digital
revolution” and the impact on copyright law).
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formalization requirements, but it can be difficult to determine
what falls within the scope of protection in a rapidly evolving
technological world. 168 The question of how to protect copyright in
a digital world raises the question of whether the concerns with
formalities are still relevant and whether formal structures may
be useful in this new environment. 169
This section begins by examining the argument in favor of
reintroducing formal structures as a way of adapting copyright to
the digital age. 170 Some scholars have advanced formalistic
structures as a solution to theft and rights clearance in the internet
era. 171 Following is a subsection which examines how formalism in
the digital age is not an appropriate solution to ongoing copyright
concerns. 172 Part IV is essential to understanding the need for a
further reduction in formalism despite arguments that formalism
is the way to adapt copyright to the twenty-first century. 173
A. The Argument in Favor of Reintroducing Formalities
Those who argue in favor of the reintroduction of copyright
formalities argue that formal structures are well suited to the
challenges of the digital environment and that the historical
concerns associated with formalization are lessened in a digital
age. 174 In the absence of copyright formalities and the “lack of
legislative definitional closure” about the scope of copyright168. See id. at 399 (“Because of the fact that copyright arises automatically
upon the creation of an original work of authorship, it is not always easy to
establish ex ante whether a particular object is protected by copyright.”).
169. See id. at 396 (articulating that “recent calls for a reintroduction of
formalities are surrounded by quite some controversy”).
170. See infra Part IV.A (putting forth arguments in favor of formalism in the
modern digital era).
171. See infra Part IV.A and accompany texts (examining the role of copyright
formalities as a solution to digital concerns).
172. See infra Part IV.B (noting arguments against formalism in the modern
digital era).
173. See supra Part IV (posing various issues regarding copyright formalities
in the modern digital age). See also infra Part VI (advancing an argument for the
abolition of limitations on remedies) and infra Part VII (arguing for shifting fee
structures).
174. See van Gompel, supra note 165, at 396 (explaining that “recent calls for
a reintroduction of formalities are surrounded by quite some controversy”).
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protectable subject matter, it is often difficult to determine
whether a work is copyrightable for new or innovative subject
matter. 175 Difficulty determining whether a work is protectable
and, if time has passed, whether a work is still under protection
“could prove a source of legal uncertainty for prospective users.” 176
In a digital environment, finding a work is hardly difficult, but
discerning who owns a work with no statement of authorship or
ownership creates a challenge for “the clearance of rights.” 177 The
digital era has vastly increased the challenges associated with
licensing works as information is so widely available online. 178
Supporters of a return to formalization also point to the ways in
which the internet has changed what is worthy of copyright
protection. 179 The proponents observe that “copyright undeniably
aims at protecting creators and creative industries against freeriding by others[.]” 180 “[T]he costs of producing and disseminating
content have fallen so significantly that it is doubtful whether all
works automatically merit the strong and long-term copyright
protection that is presently granted.” 181 While registration and
having a record of ownership are beneficial and desirable,
formalities impose barriers to entry into the copyright system
which can prevent creators from securing protection. 182
175. See id. at 399 (highlighting how difficulties arise with copyrighting due
to the lack of both formalities and “‘legislative definitional closure’”) (quoting
Kathy Bowrey, The Outer Limits of Copyright Law: Where Law Meets Philosophy
and Culture, 12 LAW & CRITIQUE 75, 85 (2001)).
176. Id. at 400–1 (citing Lucie Guibault, Wrapping Information in Contract:
How Does it Affect the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAN:
IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 87, 95 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006)).
177. See id. at 401 (pointing out the challenges regarding rights clearance for
online content).
178. See id. at 401–2 (“Although these licensing difficulties are certainly not
new, they clearly have exacerbated in recent times.”).
179. See id. at 405 (“[I]t is highly questionable whether, in the current digital
era, all works should automatically warrant copyright protection.”).
180. See id. (pointing to social media posts on Facebook and other digital
platforms to conclude that content is now largely produced “not for commercial
purposes, but for the benefit of social sharing and remixing”) (citing James
Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 212 (2005)).
181. Id.
182. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright
Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 342 (2010)
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B. The Argument Against Formalities
Successfully copyrighting a work in a formalistic copyright
system presents challenges which artists must overcome in order
to protect their work: knowledge and money become more
important in a formalistic system. 183 Making copyright protection
conditional upon complying with formal requirements has the
potential to exclude those who “are ignorant of the obligation” and
fail to comply from protection. 184 For those who are inexperienced
with copyright formalities, this could result in works inadvertently
entering the public domain and depriving artists of
compensation. 185 Further, the cost of protecting one’s work in a
formalistic system can quickly become prohibitive, especially for
an artist who “creates a large volume of works” and therefore pays
a larger number of fees. 186
The $45 fee for electronic filings and $125 for paper filings can
quickly add up for an artist who produces a larger volume of
work. 187 It is entirely possible that an artist could not afford to
register all their works, as the fee-per-work registration costs pile
up. 188 Artists could be placed in the position of choosing which of
their works they should seek copyright protection for, gambling
their ability to protect their creations by having to correctly predict
which ones attract an audience. 189 Filing fees are increased to $760
(noting that the benefits of formalization can also present drawbacks for
“individual creators”).
183. See id. at 342–43 (arguing that “some are ignorant of the obligation” to
comply with formal requirements, while “some may find the fees prohibitive”).
184. See id. at 342 (providing alternative reasons for why some creators fail
to satisfy the requirements for copyright protections, other than lack of care for
their works).
185. See Greene, supra note 40, at 354 (describing how allowing creators’ work
into the public domain results “in the loss of their economic rights to copyright
protection”).
186. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 342 (explaining fee structures in
copyright registration).
187. See Fees, COPYRIGHT.GOV (outlining the fee structures for musical artists)
[https://perma.cc/5E36-CBXF].
188. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 342–43 (“The author who cannot afford
to register all her works might wait to see which of her works attracts an audience
before selecting which to register, but this strategy could prove perilous.”).
189. See id. at 343 (noting that waiting to register “could prove perilous” for
many artists).
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for “eve-of-litigation registration” 190 which could be prohibitively
expensive to artists in a nation where nearly half of Americans
cannot cover a $400 expense without borrowing money or selling
something. 191 This financial state of affairs is particularly relevant
as “[c]ertain groups––African Americans, Hispanics, lower-income
people––have fewer financial resources than others.” 192 Many
Americans lack knowledge of the fundamentals of finance––”65%
of Americans age 25 to 65 were financial illiterates.” 193 The
increasing complexity of financial systems creates additional
challenges that can spark worse “financial insecurity for [their]
citizens.” 194 Not only are the increased fees a potential challenge
for creators, but some forms of damages are only available for
works registered within three months of publication or within a
month of infringement occurring, whichever is earlier. 195 Statutory
damages and attorney’s fees are only available when a creator
promptly registers. 196 The costs of waiting are potentially
disastrous: “the author who waits to see what succeeds . . . . will
have lost the opportunity to obtain statutory damages and
attorney[‘]s fees, and therefore might find she cannot afford to
bring the suit.” 197
One of the espoused benefits of creating a formal copyright
register is to create a centralized location to check ownership and

190. See id. (highlighting the increase in registration fees) (citing La Resolana
Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); Corbis
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Strategy
Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); Do Denim, LLC v. Fried
Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
191. See Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, THE
ATLANTIC (May 2016) (conveying the financial state of “middle-class Americans”
and the impact of unexpected expenses) [https://perma.cc/Q44S-5273].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. (“It is ironic that as financial products have become increasingly
sophisticated, theoretically giving individuals more options to smooth out the
bumps in their lives, something like the opposite seems to have happened, at least
for many.”).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (noting the time period in which an action
must be brought).
196. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 343 (pointing out that statutory
damages and attorney’s fees are only available in certain registration contexts).
197. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006)).
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to secure greater copyright compliance. 198 Copyright compliance is
not just a legal system, but also rests on a societal framework in
which the norms of ownership and creativity impact the viability
of protecting one’s copyright. 199 Copyright ideals are “rooted in
some deeper understanding of society’s regard for creativity,
property, economic efficiency, or fundamental justice.” 200 The
internet’s ability to perpetuate and facilitate digital piracy is
staggering. 201 Copyright owners and creators open themselves up
to risk when sharing their creations online and they “have become
increasingly frustrated at [the] failure [by the music industry],
both through legal or technological means, to halt or even
substantially slow the rapid growth of piracy perpetuated by
means of peer-to-peer networks.” 202 This mass-scale piracy is
carried out by consumers and “large numbers of people see filesharing as permissible.” 203 Digital sharing norms indicate that
that “[v]ast segments of the potential market for copyrightprotected content have the access, ability and inclination to make
unauthorized copies of albums, movies, books and video games
with little fear of recrimination and feel it is permissible to do
so.” 204 The notion that a comprehensive register of music copyright
would enable quicker and easier copyright checks rests on the
notion that individuals are inclined to check at all. 205 Efforts by the

198. See supra Part IV.A (putting forward the positive aspects of
formalization).
199. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1227 (citing Jon M. Garon, Normative
Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88
CORNELL. L. REV. 1278, 1283 (2003) (arguing that copyright law relies on certain
societal norms in order to foster compliance and provide enforcement)).
200. See id. (quoting Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual
Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1283
(2003)).
201. See Steven A. Hetcher, The Music Industry’s Failed Attempt to Influence
File Sharing Norms, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 10 (2004) (“While this technology
promises vastly more efficient means of distribution and consumption of content,
the industry has also viewed this potential as constrained by the technology’s
ability to perpetuate digital piracy.”).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 10–11.
205. See id. (arguing that certain societal norms are “at the heart of the
industry’s ability to deter mass-scale copyright infringement” and a significant
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music industry have largely failed to shift this norm in part
because of the “negative public perception of the music
industry”. 206 Questions of digital norms in the digital age implicate
the Berne Convention and spark questions of the value of
international unity.
Uniformity across boarders via the Berne Convention is
relevant to the question of whether an American formalistic
system should be reinstated. 207 In order for creators to secure
protection in a foreign territory, they must comply with the
requirements of the territory. 208 Securing international protection
presents challenges and differing standards of formalistic
requirements can make it “very difficult to secure international
protection, especially at a multinational level.” 209 The Berne
Convention simplified matters for all the signatory states,
including the United States. 210
Copyright formalization structures are just one of the many
areas where the systemic inequality of the American system is
visible, where the “[B]lack artistry has created it while white
ownership has profited disproportionately from it.” 211 Assessing
whether re-instituting copyright formalities is appropriate
requires considering what challenges would be created by a
formalistic structure and whether the same concerns of
exploitation and appropriation or theft persist for artists of
color. 212

part of the digital piracy problem). Contra Part IV.B (discussing why formalities
may not be a solution to digital concerns).
206. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1227 (quoting Jennifer Norman, Staying
Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
371, 405 (2003)); see generally Hetcher, supra note 201.
207. See generally van Gompel, supra note 165 (outlining the international
implications of certain copyright formalities).
208. See id. at 19–20 (highlighting the persistent difficulties creators
experienced with securing international copyright protections in the past).
209. Id. at 20.
210. See id. at 20; see also supra Part II.D (explaining the impact of the Berne
Convention).
211. Greene, supra note 1, at 1227 (quoting Frank Kofsky, Black Music, White
Business: Illuminating the History and Political Economy of Jazz 84 (1977)).
212. See Hines, supra note 116, at 476–77 (providing the various ways in
which Black creators have had their artistic creations or profits stolen).

CHECK YOUR BANK ACCOUNT FIRST

171

V. The Present Age: Ongoing Issues
Despite seemingly being a race and gender-neutral legal
structure, IP and copyright have the potential to “reinforce social
domination” as “the raw material for popular culture . . . .” 213 In
considering reinstituting copyright formalities, it is important to
consider whether formal structures are “reinforcing unequal social
constructs through the dynamics of IP protection.” 214 This section
first discusses some of the failures of the Music Modernization Act
(MMA). 215 The purpose of briefly discussing the MMA is to
highlight the need for further legislation and modernization. This
section next turns to the historic and ongoing discrimination
against BIPOC in the United States. 216 A foundational
understanding of the systemic, persistent economic inequality that
communities of color experience is essential to examining the
impact of the copyright fee structure and limitations on remedies
of Section 412. 217
A. The Music Modernization Act Fails to Adequately Protect
Artists
The Music Modernization Act (MMA) was a 2018 piece of
legislation designed to address gaps in royalty payments within
the music industry. 218 Major players in the music industry and
213. K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender:
Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 379 (2008).
214. See id. at 385 (discussing the “critical project of IP examination” through
the lenses of critical race and gender theory).
215. See infra Part V.A (stressing the failures and inadequacies of the Music
Modernization Act).
216. See infra Part V.B (examining the ongoing economic inequality within
communities of color).
217. See infra Part V.B (outlining the persistent economic inequality within
communities of color); see also Cary Martin Shelby, Profiting From Our Pain:
Privileged Access to Social Impact Investing, 109 CALIF. 102 (2021) (emphasizing
the economic realities within communities of color to measure the accessibility
and efficacy of race-conscious solutions).
218. See Spencer Paveck, All the Bells and Whistles, but the Same Old Song
and Dance: A Detailed Critique of Title I of the Music Modernization Act, 19 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 74, 75 (2019) (explaining why the MMA was originally
implemented).
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major artists embraced the legislation as “a much-needed revamp
of music legislation . . . .” 219 However, the MMA “falls short of its
goals” to modernize royalty structures and properly compensate
creators. 220 One of the goals of the MMA was to address the
historical marginalization of creators and artists that were
“exacerbated by the systemic manipulation and abuse of the
copyright law and music sound recording contracts and licensing
agreements.” 221 The MMA sought to “close [a] bizarre legal
loophole allowing online streaming services not to pay royalties for
pre-1972 songs.” 222 The MMA solves this problem by establishing
“a new rate setting standard to be applied by the Copyright
Royalty Judges [of the Copyright Royalty Board].” 223 However,
Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) proceedings and the larger
administrative state of musical copyright have been slow to adapt
to the digital streaming world. 224
While the issues related to the failure of royalty structures to
adapt to the digital streaming world are beyond the scope of this
Note, this shortfall of the MMA is significant insofar as creators
suffer the consequences. 225 The MMA also did not go far enough in

219. Id. (outlining several major endorsements of the MMA by members of
the music industry).
220. Id. at 76 (“Although the royalty frameworks established by the MMA
represent a necessary modernization of the royalty payment process and provide
for increased compensation to songwriters, overall, the MMA—and Title I in
particular—falls short of its purported goals.”).
221. Update on the Passage of the Music Modernization Act, INST. FOR INTELL.
PROP. & SOC. JUST. [https://perma.cc/CE5C-H9VF].
222. Steve Knopper, ‘Music Creators Should Be Compensated,’ Says
Copyright Office, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 6, 2015, 8:38PM) [https://perma.cc/WV7AGJ3T].
223. Music Modernization: Frequently Asked Questions, COPYRIGHT.GOV
[https://perma.cc/9GG8-ZB25].
224. See generally Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works in
the Digital Age: Why the Current Process is Ineffective & How Congress is
attempting to Fix It, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 113 (2008) (stating the ongoing issues with
interactive and non-interactive digital streaming).
225. See Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of
Streaming, 2 BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 322–24 (2018)
(weighing the positives and negatives of royalty structures in the MMA).
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addressing the pre-1972 loophole that it purports to resolve. 226
Protections provided under the MMA provide “most of the same
rights and remedies that apply to copyrighted sound recordings”
but “expressly denies that pre-1972 sound recordings are protected
by copyright.” 227 These owners of exclusive rights are referred to
as a “rights owner” rather than the owner of a copyright. 228 Worse
still, this protection is “defer[ed] largely to state law. In doing so,
it creates significant and unnecessary uncertainty.” 229 State law
copyright varies wildly and was available as a source of copyright
prior to this legislation. 230
The royalty structure of the MMA, in combination with
copyright protection, presents a tremendous risk to
unsophisticated creators. 231 In order to receive royalties for
streamed compositions, creators must register their compositions
with the Copyright Office of the Mechanical Licensing Collective
(MLC). 232 This “process disproportionately affects songwriters
with limited access to information and resources,” and navigating
the landscape without legal representation can be challenging. 233
Musical copyright, like countless if not all systems in America, is
one where access to money is an asset, and BIPOC have been

226. See id. at 325 (“[T]he new law offers significant benefits to record labels
and recording artists who own rights in these recordings. However, it also creates
ambiguities and potential conflicts with other provisions in federal law.”).
227. Id. at 327.
228. See id. (“For this reason, § 1401 consistently refers to the owner of
exclusive right in a pre-1972 sound recording as the ‘rights owner’ rather than
the copyright owner.”).
229. Id. at 330.
230. See id. at 331–32 (explaining that state laws “vary” with respect to what
degree of protection is provided, who the owner is, and may even create conflicts
of law problems).
231. See Payeck, supra note 218, at 91 (“MMA Title I requires songwriters to
be registered if they wish to receive royalties for their compositions: For
songwriters to be entitled to receipt of their royalties, they must be identifiable in
the records of the MLC.”).
232. See id. (citing Holland Gormley, The Breakdown: What Songwriters Need
to Know about the Music Modernization Act and Royalty Payments, LIBR. OF
CONG. (Apr. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KAM5-GZ2A]).
233. See id. at 91–92 (explaining the challenges faced by unsophisticated
artists).
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systemically excluded from systems of generational wealth
building that are essential to building capital. 234
B. Historic and Ongoing Exclusion of BIPOC From Wealth
Building Tools
The fundamentally unequal economic landscape of the United
States provides the backdrop for analyzing the state and future of
copyright formalities with a race conscious lens. Many associate
the struggles that Black Americans have faced with slavery and
segregation, as visible systems of oppression which suppressed and
kept Black Americans from benefiting from the same system they
provided the labor for. 235 While these periods are unarguably
oppressive and cruel, in recent times the struggles faced by BIPOC
have persisted but are less starkly visible than de jure systems of
segregation. 236
Between 1983 and 2013, the average wealth of white families
has grown by 84%––three times the rate for the Black
population. 237 If that trend continued, “the average wealth of
234. See Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell, & Abril Castro, Systemic
Inequality: Displacement, Exclusion, and Segregation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Aug. 7, 2019) (explaining how “historic and ongoing displacement, exclusion, and
segregation” prevent BIPOC from obtaining and retaining their own homes,
which are “critical tools for wealth building and financial well-being”)
[https://perma.cc/B4M5-FHLP].
235. See PBS, Ten ‘Must Watch’ Black History Documentaries (Oct. 10, 2013)
(elaborating that the “[d]ocumentaries offer rich insight into our society and
culture, connect us to some of our proudest and most shameful moments in
American history, and remind us how far we’ve come.” The vast majority of top
ten list are related to the Civil Rights Movement and slavery)
[https://perma.cc/Q6LZ-CQ3N]. See also MAKSYM CHORNYI, Best Movies About
Slavery and Racism (Feb. 5, 2018) (listing almost exclusively (6 out of 7) films
about slavery and the Civil Rights Movement as the most descriptive of the Black
experience) [https://perma.cc/L3TN-ES28].
236. See Robert Longley, What is De Jure Segregation? Definition and
Examples, THOUGHTCO. (last updated Feb. 28, 2021) (explaining that de jure
segregation is segregation “according to the law,” which includes systems such as
“Jim Crow Laws”) [https://perma.cc/XF8F-W6VA].
237. See DERICK ASANTE-MUHAMMED, CHUCK COLLINS, JOSH HOXIE, &
EMANUEL NIEVES, THE EVER-GROWING GAP: WITHOUT CHANGE, AFRICAN-AMERICAN
AND LATINO FAMILIES WON’T MATCH WHITE WEALTH FOR CENTURIES, 5 (Inst. for
Pol’y Stud. ed., 2016) (highlighting the rate of growth of wealth for white families)
[https://perma.cc/V8MJ-SWMT].
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White households [would] increase by over $18,000 per year, while
Latino and Black households would see their respective wealth
increase by about $2,250 and $750 per year.” 238 At this pace “it
would take Black families 228 years to amass the same amount of
wealth White families have today,” just a few years short of the
245 years that slavery was the law of the land. 239 Generations of
discrimination and de jure segregation have resulted in “a slew of
economic inequalities that exacerbate the social disparities they
face.” 240 The average White household wealth is $656,000 and the
average Black household wealth is $85,000––this wealth
inequality “has only served to further compound and exacerbate
[the] racial wealth divide.” 241 This ever growing wealth disparity
is the “natural result of public policies past and present that have
either been purposefully or thoughtlessly designed to widen the
economic chasm between White households and households of
color . . . .” 242 Significant reform is needed to address the wealth
divide as overall wealth inequality continues to remain “on track
to become even wider in the future.” 243
Black and Latino populations have much higher
unemployment rates than their White counterparts––8.6% for
Black workers, 5.8% for Latino workers, 4.4% for white workers. 244
Black families have a median household income $20,000 per a year
lower than the average White household income, $13,000 for
Latino families. 245 There are serious gaps on the ability to handle
financial emergencies, as “Black and Latino families face financial
238. See id. (emphasis added).
239. See id. (emphasis added) (explaining the wealth inequality based on race
in the US).
240. See id. at 6 (advocating for expanding conversations around the problems
surrounding racial inequality requires a system wide approach and specifically
looking into wealth disparity).
241. See id. (discussing “the lingering effects of generations of discriminatory
and wealth-stripping practices” which have fueled the fire of inequality).
242. See id. (discussing the origins of the racial wealth divide).
243. See id. (“In the absence of significant reforms, the racial wealth divide–
–and overall wealth inequality––are on track to become even wider in the
future.”).
244. See id. at 8 (discussing unemployment variation based on race).
245. See id. (“[T]hey face a median household income gap that sees them
earning about $13,000 [for Latino households] and $20,000 [for Black households]
less per a year, respectively, than the median White household earns ($50,400).”).
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insecurity at about double the rate of White families.” 246 For many
families this means turning to less than ideal financial services,
such as prepaid cards and non-bank transfers (money orders, etc.),
to meet every day financial needs, which have high fees and result
in “stripping families of much-needed financial resources.” 247 This
economic gap is the result of countless generations having “wealth
and economic opportunity stripped” and stolen from Black
Americans. 248
This inequality stems from generations of policy which have
served to strip Black communities of wealth and financial
stability. 249 Black Americans were excluded from programs which
paved the path to homeownership and economic opportunity for
countless White Americans. 250 Practices of redlining, a policy
classifying predominately nonwhite neighborhoods as hazardous
and therefore risky investments for banks, kept Black Americans
from buying homes and “undermined wealth building in black
communities.” 251 Home ownership helps families to build and
eventually transfer wealth across generations, which in turn
provides economic stability and starter capital to the next
generation. 252 Currently, college educated Black Americans are
less likely to own their home than White Americans who never
finished high school. 253 Economic inequality in America is not an
246. Id.
247. See id. (explaining that Black households that are “relying on alternative
financial serves” lose wealth from associated fees and interest).
248. See id. at 11 (“For Black and Latino households––who for years have had
their wealth and economic opportunity stripped from them––overcoming these
inequities seems almost impossible.”).
249. See Solomon, Maxwell, & Castro, supra note 234 (discussing how public
policy to combat “urban blight, or bolstering economic development” has resulted
in “stripping Black communities of the wealth and financial stability”).
250. See id. (“[T]he federal government established several programs in the
20th century that were designed to promote homeownership and provide a
pathway to the middle class. However, these programs largely benefited white
households while excluding Black families.”).
251. See id. (discussing the process of redlining which resulted in “just 2
percent of the $120 billion in FHA loans distributed between 1934 and 1962 were
given to nonwhite families”).
252. See id. (“Federal home loan programs allowed households––the majority
of them white––to build and transfer assets across generations, contributing to
flaring racial disparities in homeownership and wealth.”).
253. See id. (discussing the disparity between Black and white households).
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issue of the past and Black Americans are still faced with the
legacy of generations of economic and social oppression. 254 This
fundamentally unequal economic landscape provides the backdrop
for analyzing the state and future of copyright formalities with a
race conscious lenses. 255
VI. Abolishing Registration Timeline for Remedies
Copyright formalities have been lauded as a solution to the
challenges of music copyright enforcement in the digital age. 256
However, formalistic copyright structures can become, quite
simply, barriers to entry based on one’s knowledge of registration
requirements and ability to afford the registration fee. 257 The $45
fee for electronic filings and $125 for paper filings can quickly add
up for an artist who produces a larger volume of work, such as
musical artists who are constantly producing music in the hopes of
getting picked up by a major label. 258 It is entirely possible that an
artist could not afford to register all their works, as the fee-perwork registration can quickly become a substantial sum. 259
The United States has a long history of displacing, excluding,
and segregating BIPOC in a way that has created long-lasting and
persistent economic strains within communities of color. 260 Latino
and Black families face severe income gaps when compared to
254. See id. (“Across the country, historic and ongoing displacement,
exclusion, and segregation prevent people of color from obtaining and retaining
homeownerships, as well as accessing safe, affordable housing.”).
255. See generally id. (discussing the state of economic inequality in America);
ASANTE-MUHAMMED, COLLINS, HOXIE, & NIEVES, supra note 237 (explaining
persisting wealth gaps in America).
256. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text (arguing that more
formalistic structures provide a solution to determining ownership and allowing
for more efficient licensing).
257. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 342 (discussing fee structures).
258. See Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (describing fee structures)
[https://perma.cc/5E36-CBXF].
259. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 342 (discussing fee structures).
260. See SOLOMON, MAXWELL & CASTRO, supra note 234 (discussing the impact
of policy decisions on wealth in communities of color as a result of “displacement,
exclusion, and segregation”). See also ASANTE-MUHAMMED, COLLINS, HOXIE, &
NIEVES, supra note 237, at 6 (explaining persisting wealth gaps in America and
that Latino and Black households own an average of six to seven times less wealth
than White households).
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White families, 261 double the rates of financial insecurity, 262 and
much higher rates of unemployment than their White
counterparts. 263 Economic inequality is linked with racial
inequality and economic flexibility is essential to security and
opportunity. 264 The elements of “economic advantage are
structurally intertwined” 265 and could impact the ability of artists
of color to take advantage of the copyright system. The $45 fee for
electronic filings and $125 for paper filings can quickly add up, 266
and may provide a greater barrier to entry for Black creators who
have been subjected to generations of intentional wealth-stripping
practices and compounding wealth inequality. 267
In light of the persistent and ongoing economic inequality
faced by creators of color, the registration prerequisite formality
which persists in Section 412 of Title 17 could disproportionately
disadvantage BIPOC and limit the ability to seek remedies for
infringement. 268 Statutory damages and attorney’s fees are only

261. See ASANTE-MUHAMMED, COLLINS, HOXIE, & NIEVES, supra note 237, at 8
(stating that Latino and Black families earn approximately $13,000 and $20,000
less per a year respectively than the median white household).
262. See id. (“Black and Latino families face financial insecurity at about
double the rate of White families.”).
263. See id. (citing unemployment rates of 8.6% for Black workers, 5.8% for
Latino workers, contrasted with 4.4% for white workers).
264. See id. at 6 (explaining that income inequality alone is not an appropriate
measure of long-term inequality and “the essential role that wealth plays in
achieving financial security and opportunity”).
265. See Angela Anwuachi–Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and
Classic Race–baiting: What’s in a Definition?, 88 U. DENV. L. REV. 807, 815 (2011)
(citing Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and
Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1870–72 (1996)).
266. See Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (describing fee structures)
[https://perma.cc/5E36-CBXF].
267. See SOLOMON, MAXWELL & CASTRO, supra note 234 (discussing “wealthstripping practices” and the impact of policy decisions on wealth in communities
of color as a result of “displacement, exclusion, and segregation”); see also ASANTEMUHAMMED, COLLINS, HOXIE, & NIEVES, supra note 237, at 6 (explaining
persisting wealth gaps in America and that Latino and Black households own an
average of six to seven times less wealth than White households).
268. See supra Part V.B and accompanying text (discussing ongoing racial
and economic inequality). See also 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (creating a registration
prerequisite to being awarded statutory damages (17 U.S.C. § 504 (2018)) or
attorney’s fees (17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018))).
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available when a creator promptly registers. 269 The costs of waiting
are disastrous: “the author who waits to see what succeeds . . . .
will have lost the opportunity to obtain statutory damages and
attorney[‘]s fees, and therefore might find she cannot afford to
bring the suit.” 270 Despite the abolition of copyright formalities
upon the United States’ entry to the Berne Convention, a vestige
of the registration requirement still lurks in the United States
Copyright Code. 271 Section 412 of Title 17 bars the statutory
damages as well as attorney’s fees remedies unless a creator has
registered their copyright within a certain time frame. 272
This requirement has the potential to be particularly
damaging to Black creators not only because of generations of
wealth-stripping practices, but also because of the unique aspects
of Black musical tradition. 273 Historically, Black musical styles
rely heavily on improvisation and the “constant state of revision”
of improvisation does not allow for a fixation in a medium which
truly captures the work. 274 Each unique variation would require a
separate registration––the structure of improvisation “frustrates”
the concept of fixing a work as a final and complete product in one
moment of time. 275 Styles of group creation and improvisation both
trace their roots to slavery in the United States. 276 But the
importance of community composition and revision in Black
musical tradition still persists in music by Black creators in genres

269. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 343 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) and
explaining the perils of waiting).
270. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006)).
271. See supra Part II.D and accompanying text (explaining the impact of the
Berne Convention).
272. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (“Registration as a prerequisite to certain
remedies for infringement . . . .”).
273. See supra Part V.B and accompanying text (discussing ongoing racial
and economic inequality); see supra Part III.A and accompanying text (discussing
unique aspects of Black musical tradition).
274. See Hines, supra note 116, at 469 (explaining that improvisation
“frustrates” fixation).
275. See id. 469 (explaining that improvisation “frustrates” fixation
requirements).
276. See id. at 472 (“[T]he first Black musical genre in the United State
emerged from slavery . . . .”).
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such as rap, R&B, and countless others. 277 Such styles create
particular challenges of Section 412: either register every variation
of a song or place yourself at risk of losing access to meaningful
monetary remedies for your failure to do so. 278
Creators who are unable to pay to register their works within
the three months that Section 412 requires are punished by losing
the significant remedies provided in the statute. 279 This choice
between registration to protect remedies or failure to register at
the expense of one’s remedies is one which is unduly punitive to
artists of color. Historically, Black musical styles and traditions
which do not fit well into fixed, formalized copyright structures. 280
This distinct music style in combination with the prior and
persistent economic inequality as a result of exclusion and
discrimination 281 creates a perfect storm for artists of color to once
again be excluded from the copyright system. “IP scholars are
increasingly recognizing that the legal regimes of intellectual
property are inextricably linked to systems of social and economic
inequality.” 282 A small step towards correcting an ongoing system
of social and economic inequality is removing the registration
requirement from Section 412. The lurking registration
requirement of Section 412 ignores the persistent economic
inequality which is closely tied to race in the United States and
removing this statutory provision removes a potential barrier to
copyright protection for artists of color. 283
“As new technologies continue to cause explosive growth in the
value of information, the value of copyrights and intellectual

277. See id. at 464 (“The Black musical tradition works in a ‘trope of revision,’
that is, it is a highly creative tradition that builds and improves upon the music
within its community.”).
278. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (barring certain remedies after non-registration).
279. See id. (limiting remedies).
280. See supra Part III.A and accompanying text (explaining unique Black
musical traditions which rely heavily on group creation and improvisation, both
of which don’t mesh well with formalistic requirements).
281. See supra Part V.B and accompanying text (discussing ongoing racial
and economic inequality).
282. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1182.
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (making registration a prerequisite to certain
remedies for infringement).

CHECK YOUR BANK ACCOUNT FIRST

181

property will continue to increase sharply.” 284 Making sure that
the systems of copyright are accessible to creators of color is an
important priority in creating a more equal and fair society, and
making copyright systems accessible requires looking to the social
and economic realities that Black creators face. 285 Copyright
systems in the United States have previously been used to deny
Black creators their “credit, copyright royalties and fair
compensation.” 286 Historically, Black artists have not reaped the
benefits of copyright protections and their work has been
appropriated on an industrial scale. 287
In the past, the structural inequality of the American legal
system, and American society, has impacted the copyright system
in a way that has failed to serve the interests of Black creators. 288
Despite their invaluable cultural contributions, “Black artists did
not share rewards commiserate with their enormous creativity.” 289
The economic and societal benefits of IP ownership eluded, or were
taken from, Black artists for much of American history as a result
of existing within a system of racial discrimination. 290 It is
necessary to consider how Section 412 may perpetuate theft of
work or profits from artists of color and continue the sordid legacy
of keeping Black creators from engaging with and profiting from
the copyright system. 291

284. See Greene, supra note 40, at 341.
285. See supra Part V.B (discussing ongoing economic inequality and it aligns
with race).
286. Greene, supra note 1, at 1181.
287. See id. (“The mass appropriation of the work of black artists and
inventors reflects the systemic subordination based on race that characterized
most of U.S. history.”).
288. See id. (“Copyright law exists within social structures that historically
did not serve the interests of black cultural production.”).
289. Id. at 1183–84.
290. See id. at 1189 (“For much of American history, the valuable rights of IP
(including compensation, credit and control) eluded Black artists operating in a
social system of racial discrimination.”); Black artists were also excluded from
artists protection organizations such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) further exacerbating inequality.
291. See supra Part III.B, Part III.D (explaining how copyright systems were
used to intentionally exclude creators of color).
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The remedies which Section 412 limits based on a failure to
register are significant remedies for creators. Section 504 292
governs the damages which are available for infringement and
Section 505 provides for attorney’s fees as a remedy. 293 Section 504
states that an infringer is liable for either actual damages and
profit or the statutory damages, with additional damages being
awarded in certain severe circumstances. 294 The statutory
damages provided by Section 504 range from $750–$30,000 “as the
court considers just.” 295 These damages are significant because
they are available without the creator having to prove actual harm,
as is required by actual damages and profit loss. 296
It can be challenging for creators to prove they have been
actually damaged by infringement and is often the most
contentious portion of any IP suit. 297 Statutory damages are
available without the proof of actual harm suffered as a result of
infringement and remove one of the most difficult portions of an
infringement suit. 298 These statutory damages are also provided
for each work which was infringed upon, so each work essentially
is entitled to a set amount of damages regardless of if the creator
was ‘actually’ harmed in the legal sense. 299 Section 504 also allows
for increased damages up to $150,000 if the court finds “that
infringement was committed willfully[.]” 300 These amounts of
damages are significant, but are almost certainly especially
292. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2018).
293. See id. § 505 (limiting the award to “reasonable” attorney’s fees).
294. See id. § 504 (specifying that the plaintiff may be entitled to “an
additional award of two times the amount of the license fee”).
295. Id. § 504(c)(1).
296. See id. (allowing for collection without proof of actual harm suffered); but
see § 504(b) (requiring the owner to prove “actual damages suffered by him or her
as a result of infringement”).
297. See What Are Statutory Damages and Why Do They Matter? COPYRIGHT
ALL., (“Statutory damages are important because the alternative type of damage
award is “actual damages,” which must be proven in court and can be very
difficult to establish.”) [https://perma.cc/NX7L-S686].
298. See id. (“Actual damages are often difficult to prove, so statutory
damages are beneficial to copyright owners because they remove the difficult of
providing evidence of actual damages.”).
299. See id. (explaining the value of statutory damages); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) (2018).
300. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).
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significant to any creator who struggles financially. Section 505
provides that the plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees are available
as a remedy for infringement. 301
Because of Section 505 the court “in its discretion may allow
the recovery of full costs.” 302 A specific statutory grant of attorney’s
fees and costs is a meaningful remedy, especially for a creator who
struggles financially. Attorney’s fees as a remedy creates an
incentive for lawyers to take infringement cases even when the
infringement is not willful because “fees are a necessary evil” even
for lawyers. 303 Section 412 is particularly harmful because it strips
both of these remedies simultaneously. A lawyer will likely not
take your case if they have to fight tooth and nail to prove actual
harm unless the damages are high enough that it would be worth
their while. Thus, a failure to register promptly strips creators of
two incredibly significant remedies for infringement, remedies
which are the most significant to creators struggling financially.
Removing the limitations on remedies in Section 412 treats a
symptom of the larger problem and taking steps towards
addressing race in copyright requires examining the fee structure
as well.
VII. Adopting an Alternative Fee Structure
In addition to abolishing the limitations on remedy of Section
412, the copyright fee structure should be changed to make
copyright more accessible to creators. The expense of registering
works can quickly become prohibitively expensive for creators and
shifting the fee structure of registration would make registration
more feasible. 304 This section will propose two potential remedies
to the expense of registration: one based on the scaled fee structure
in the patent system and another allowing for bulk registration.

301. Id. § 505.
302. Id.
303. See Richard Stim, Small Entities and Micro Entities: What’s the
Difference When Paying Patent Fees? NOLO (discussing how the USPTO “seeks
to help smaller businesses and individual inventor afford the patent process” and
that fees are “relative” to size) [https://perma.cc/8B84-39SZ].
304. See supra Part III.D (explaining the impact on artists of color); see also
supra Part IV (discussing how impactful fees can be on artists).
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A. Scaled Fee Structure Analogous to the Patent Fee System
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) fee
structure provides an excellent skeleton for one potential scaled fee
structure. 305 The USPTO distinguishes between three different
categories in determining what fee is paid: micro entities, small
entities, and other than a small or micro entity. 306 While the “fees
are a necessary evil” the USPTO builds in a fee schedule that seeks
to encourage innovation by providing financial break to smaller
companies and independent inventors. 307 The difference in fee
based on size gives substantial financial to small and micro filers:
small entity filers receive a half discount and micro entity filers
receive a seventy-five percent discount of the standard fee. 308 The
goal of this type of tiered system is to encourage innovation and to
help smaller scale inventors by lowering their fees relative to large
corporations. 309
Within this tiered structure the standard $320 filing fee
becomes a $160 filing fee for a small entity or a $80 filing fee for a
micro entity. 310 Both small and micro entity filing status come with
limitations on who can qualify for the benefits of reduced fees. 311
To qualify as a small entity an applicant must certify that they are
an individual, a small business with no more than 500 employees,
a university, or a qualifying nonprofit. 312 To qualify as a micro
entity an applicant must be one of the within one of the categories
for qualification as a small entity and certify that in addition they
have not filed more than four previous patents, that their income
is not greater than three times the median household income for
the preceding year, that the inventor is not obligated to convey the
305. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2021) (displaying fee differences based on
organization size).
306. See id. (listing fee structures based on small, micro, or other status).
307. See Stim, supra note 303 (noting the necessity of the application fees).
308. See id. (explaining the fee structure tier and discount level).
309. See id. (“The goal of this multi-tiered system is to provide a break for
smaller companies and independent inventors, and to encourage innovation.”).
310. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2021) (displaying fee differences based on
organization size).
311. See id. § 1.29 (explaining limitations on micro entity status); id. at § 1.27
(describing limitations on small entity status).
312. See id. (illustrating limitations on small entity status).
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patent to an entity with an income greater than three times the
median household income for the preceding year. 313
Adopting fee structure similar to the USPTO in the Copyright
Office could have a dramatic impact on creators who are working
independently or are not affiliated with large record labels. Having
a tiered structure will make protecting their works more accessible
to creators who have smaller scale financial success or are not very
experienced in the industry. The Copyright Office should take a
page out of the USPTO’s book and adopt a scaled fee structure of
small entity, micro entity, and other than small or micro entity. 314
The criteria for small entity could be adopted with no alteration
and criteria for micro entity would only have the minor shift from
‘patent’ to ‘works’ to fit within the Copyright Office’s fee
structure. 315 This small shift in fee structure would be incredibly
meaningful for creators who are seeking to protect their work and
are currently being limited by their financial ability to do so.
Adopting the USPTO’s fee structure at the Copyright Office is one
possible structure which could better serve the interests of smaller
creators. Another alternative is a bulk registration system.
B. Bulk Registration
Another potential solution to the prohibitive cost of registering
each work individually could be to allow creators to register
multiple works in a bundle. This bulk registration system would
allow creators to register more than one work per each registration
fee for creators who produce a high volume of works. One way to
adopted bulk registration could be to allow creators to file all their
works produced during a set time period (ex: quarterly, or biweekly) to be registered for one fee. A bundle system would have
to come with restrictions on who can bundle, or bulk register
works. Limiting bulk registration to creators who, like small
entities at the USPTO, are registering as individuals, or a small
business with no more than 500 employees, or a university, or a
313. See id. § 1.29 (defining limitations on micro entity status).
314. See id. § 1.16 (displaying fee differences based on an organization’s size).
315. See id. § 1.29 (explaining limitations on micro entity status); id. § 1.27
(clarifying limitations on small entity status).
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qualifying nonprofit would provide the needed check on bulk
registration. 316
Allowing creators to get ‘more bang for their buck’ in terms of
registration could alleviate some of the challenges that highvolume creators face in determining whether to register their
works. 317 Both bulk registration and a tiered fee structure
analogous to the structure of the USPTO are viable alternatives to
the current system of one fee, one registration where record labels
pay the same flat fee as an individual creator.
VIII. Conclusion
The United States currently experiences tremendous
economic inequality which is closely tied to its history of
segregation, racism, and exclusion of BIPOC. 318 Section 412 and
copyright fee structures may continue to perpetuate this trend
given the economic realities that creators of color currently face. 319
Abolishing section 412 and changing the copyright fee structure
are two small and easily adopted changes to begin to address the
legacy of racism in America. 320 Make no mistake, these changes
are limited proposals intended to provide a manageable first step
and create meaningful benefits for creators of color immediately,
but they are far from a comprehensive solution to persistent racism
in America.

316. See id. § 1.27 (explaining limitations on small entity status).
317. See supra Part III.D (discussing the challenges faced by creators based
on expense).
318. See supra Part V.B (discussing historic and ongoing economic inequality
between Black and white Americans).
319. See supra Part V (explaining the ongoing importance of being raceconscious when assessing copyright fee structures).
320. See supra Part VI (arguing for the abolition of § 412); see supra Part VII
(arguing for a change in the fee structure of the copyright office).

